Financial market interdependence has been at the epicenter of the crisis in the euro area. This paper studies the existence of contagion during the crisis, defined as a structural break in the degree of financial market interdependence during episodes of financial market mayhem. In order to identify country-specific shocks from global and regional shocks, we make use of the historical record of news. We find widespread evidence of contagion. Most country-specific shocks are transmitted to other countries beyond the normal channels of interdependence. Even though negative shocks in one country usually have negative repercussions on the other countries, we also find cases of flight to safety. Moreover, global shocks and regional shocks exert a strong impact on sovereign bond yields in the euro area during the crisis. Regional shocks sometimes affect countries in different ways, thereby again signalling the presence of flight to safety. JEL Classification: E44; F34; F36; G01; G12.
Introduction
Ever since the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, financial market interdependence has been at the epicenter of the global financial market mayhem. Much in the same fashion as the famous butterfly effect, shocks occurring in a specific asset market in a particular country seem to spread across borders throughout the entire global financial system. The international transmission of country-specific shocks should not come as a surprise. The process of globalisation has led to a relatively high level of real and financial interconnectedness across countries. This being said, however, there is often a perception that the transmission of shocks is different, in particular stronger, during episodes of financial market mayhem. In other words, the degree of financial market interdependence appears to exhibit a structural break in that it differs between normal time periods and periods of financial market turbulence. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as contagion.
This paper studies the nature of contagion between national bond markets in the euro area. Several countries which have adopted the common currency are currently suffering from heightened financial market volatility and large shocks in some countries are spreading across the whole area. Again, such a transmission of shocks may be perfectly expected given the large degree of financial integration across these countries. Yet, a more interesting question would be whether the degree of financial market interdependence has changed since the onset of this financial market mayhem. Accordingly, the first contribution of this paper is to test for contagion in the euro area. Since contagion is defined as a structural break in the degree of financial market interdependence during a crisis period, we must first specify an econometric model of financial market interdependence, and then test for a structural break. We follow the approach put forward by Favero and Giavazzi (2002) to model financial market interdependence and to test for contagion.
The second contribution of this paper arises from the use of financial market news to distinguish between global shocks, regional shocks, and purely local shocks. Financial markets are hit by a wide range of shocks. As contagion is defined by the transmission of country-specific shocks across countries, failing to identify global shocks and regional shocks may lead us to conclude, incorrectly, that contagion prevails when two national bond markets are actually affected by a common shock, be it global or regional. We use online information from Reuters to distinguish between different types of shocks. This identification procedure is interesting in and of itself as it provides significant qualitative information about the unfolding of the crisis.
We focus on the sovereign bond markets of nine euro area countries, namely Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The sample period extends from January 2007 to October 2011. Our results show that contagion has been widespread during the crisis in the euro area. Most country-specific shocks are transmitted to other countries beyond the normal channels of interdependence. Even though negative shocks in one country usually have negative repercussions on the other countries, we also find cases of flight to safety. Moreover, global shocks and regional shocks exert a strong impact on sovereign bond yields in the euro area during the crisis. Regional shocks sometimes affect countries in different ways, thereby again signalling the presence of flight to safety.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical approach put forward by Favero and Giavazzi (2002) and discusses how financial news can be used to distinguish global, regional and country-specific shocks. Section 3 deals with data. Section 4 presents our estimation results in two steps, in line with the approach of Favero and Giavazzi (2002) , and provides for further interpretation. Section 5 summarises the main messages of our paper and outlines some avenues for future research.
Empirical approach
A large literature on financial contagion developed in the aftermath of financial market mayhem in advanced economies in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and in emerging market economies during the late 1990s. This literature has focused on two related sets of issues.
First, several channels of transmission of country-specific shocks across borders have been identified, including trade and financial linkages, macroeconomic similarities, or common lender effects, to mention just a few examples. Second, and closer to the purpose of this paper, the stability of the transmission mechanism of country-specific shocks during episodes of financial market mayhem has been assessed. In this context, contagion has been defined as a structural break in the degree of financial market interdependence during crisis episodes. We follow this definition in this paper.
The traditional approach to testing for a structural break is to estimate the same econometric model over two or more different sub-samples of the data, and to test whether parameter estimates are equal across these different sub-samples. Accordingly, the empirical literature on testing for the existence of contagion starts with the identification of a crisis window, the remainder of the dataset representing a normal or tranquil time window. Dungey et al. (2005) review empirical models of contagion and conclude that differences between various contagion models are small. 1 In particular, all empirical models can be interpreted as variations of a single unifying framework, with differences arising from the amount of information put in the model to test for contagion.
Early tests of contagion focused on changes in correlation coefficients between the financial markets of different country pairs. A statistically significant change in the correlation would indicate the presence of contagion, in the sense that cross-country financial market interdependence changes during crisis episodes. Yet, tests based on correlation feature some important problems. First, Boyer, Gibson and Loretan (1999) and Forbes and Rigobon (2002) show that the correlation coefficient during the crisis period may change purely because volatility increases during that period, and not because the degree of financial market interdependence has changed. 2 Second, correlation coefficients can only be estimated for country pairs, preventing a more encompassing assessment of contagion across several countries within a single model. Third, and more importantly, any test for a struc- 1 The empirical literature on financial contagion is quite large and we refer the reader to this comprehensive survey for further discussion and references.
2 Forbes and Rigobon (2002) propose an adjustment to the correlation coefficient estimated over the crisis period. However, this adjustment is only valid under the assumption that the financial market variable in the country where the shock originates is exogenous. This assumption is unlikely to be satisfied in the case of interdependent financial markets.
tural break in the degree of financial market interdependence should be based on a model of financial market interdependence to start with. In other words, we should first specify an econometric model of financial market interdependence, and then test for a structural break. Correlation coefficients blur these two steps and prevent a correct identification of contagion. Later references have therefore proposed econometric models of financial market interdependence.
We follow the approach put forward by Favero and Giavazzi (2002) . Unlike many other estimation strategies which rely on a priori sample splits into a crisis window and a nor- approach identifies country-specific and common shocks directly from the data. 3 Since part of the contribution of our paper is to distinguish carefully between global, regional and country-specific shocks, simply splitting the sample into two sub-samples is thus inappropriate. Moreover, a negative shock in one country may exert a negative impact on another country, but a positive effect on a third country. The latter effect would arise from flight to quality, and would seem especially relevant in the context of the euro area which has often been split along a core-periphery dimension. Finally, the identification of shocks directly from the data allows us to understand whether positive and negative shocks have asymmetric contagious effects. There is sometimes a perception that negative shocks are more contagious than positive shocks. This perception can be tested empirically only when individual shocks are identified from the data.
Favero and Giavazzi (2002) develop a dynamic structural system of simultaneous equations to model financial market interdependence. This model can be written in general form as
where S is a vector of (say) sovereign bond yields, B is a non-diagonal matrix of coefficients capturing contemporaneous interdependence between bond markets, Γ is a 3 See also Bae et al. (2003) .
non-diagonal matrix of coefficients capturing dynamics, L is the standard lag operator, k is the lag length, and E is a vector of structural shocks. For the sake of the exposition, let us assume that there are only two countries, denoted as 1 and 2, and that we restrict dynamics to one lag only. None of these assumptions will be maintained in our empirical analysis but they simplify the presentation of the three-step procedure exposed hereafter.
Under these assumptions, the dynamic system is now written as
Favero and Giavazzi (2002) propose a three-step procedure to test for contagion. The first step is to estimate the reduced-form model and to identify, using dummy variables, large residuals as large shocks. The second step is to estimate the structural model of interdependence, including the dummy variables, and to make some arbitrary assumptions on the lag structure to obtain identification. Finally, a test for the existence of contagion simply amounts to testing whether dummy variables for country 1 affect sovereign bond yields of country 2 (and reciprocally) once the normal degree of financial market interdependence has been controlled for.
The reduced form of the general dynamic structural model is a vector-autoregressive specification, so that
The vector of reduced-form residuals in Equation (3) contain some very large elements corresponding to episodes of financial market mayhem. Such elements are captured by dummy variables taking a value of one on days where residuals exceed three times their standard deviation. Thus, the set of dummy variables defines the crisis sub-sample from the data and not on a a priori basis. Once days of financial market mayhem have been identified, we check the historical record of news to distinguish between global shocks, regional (euro area) shocks and country-specific shocks.
Of course, dummy variables are constructed on the basis of reduced-form residuals.
Thus, a dummy variable may capture a country-specific shock, or the transmission of a country-specific shock from another country through the normal channels of interdependence, or even the contagious transmission of a country-specific shock from another country beyond the normal channels of interdependence. Hence, in order to distinguish between these three possibilities, the second step of the approach consists in estimating the structural model of simultaneous equation including all the dummy variables. Thus,
The partitioning of the vector containing the dummy variables capturing countryspecific shocks is conditional on the country in which the shock originates. The off-diagonal elements a 12 and a 21 allow for structural breaks in the degree of financial market interdependence between countries.
The third step is simply a two-sided test of the null hypothesis of no contagion:
The test is two-sided because contagion could correspond to either stronger or weaker financial market interdependence during crisis times.
As Equation (4) instruments. Weak instruments are likely to be an issue mostly for equity market returns, for which persistency is rather small, but not so much for bond yields (the focus of our paper), for which persistency is substantial. In the end, allowing for the maximum amount of interdependence is essential in order to avoid to avoid labeling contagion what is actually just normal interdependence. Thus, we will follow Favero and Giavazzi (2002) and restrict the lag structure.
Data
We focus on the sovereign bond markets of nine euro area countries, namely Belgium, The historical record of news comes from Reuters. Once a large residual for a specific day has been identified from the first step of the empirical approach, we perform a systematic check of the news from Reuters to understand the nature of this shock: global, regional, or country-specific. We have cross-checked the information from Reuters with a Google Search of relevant financial news.
Finally, our focus on the historical record of news helps addressing the issue of nonoverlapping trading hours across international financial markets. For example, a major shock in the United States may occur when European financial markets have already closed, such that there is no contemporaneous interdependence. Of course, European markets will react when opening on the following day. But a model of financial markets focusing on contemporaneous interdependence will probably miss the transmission of this shock from the United States. Some scholars have used two-day moving averages or even average weekly data in order to solve this problem. Yet, this remedy is clearly suboptimal as averaging amounts to smoothing the time series of financial market variables, thereby possibly missing some extreme observations which are the key focus of the analysis. In contrast, our focus on the historical record of news allows us to track precisely at which time of the day a specific piece of news was released. In turn, we can match exactly news with movements in financial market variables so as to identify contemporaneous interdependence and contagion adequately.
Results
Since the empirical approach of Favero and Giavazzi (2002) proceeds in three steps, we present the results of the first step and those of the second and third steps separately.
Reduced-form model
We estimate the reduced-form VAR model assuming a maximum length of five lags and use the usual information criteria to assess the optimal lag length. The likelihood ratio test, the final prediction error (FPE) and the Akaike criterion (AIC) point to five lags, while the Schwarz criterion and the Hannan-Quinn criterion point to two lags. This different result is not surprising given the varying emphasis that these criteria put on parsimony against goodness of fit. If we increase the maximum lag length to twenty or even fifty lags, the likelihood ratio test, FPE and AIC all point to twenty or fifty lags, while the Schwarz criterion and the Hannan-Quinn criterion still point to two lags. Given the large amount of coefficients to be estimated for the structural model of interdependence, we favour parsimony against goodness of fit and select two lags. This being said, goodness of fit remains very good as all adjusted R-squared statistics remain above 0.98.
The residuals feature a number of values above three times their standard deviation.
These extreme residuals indicate days of extreme financial market mayhem. Figure 1 displays the count of positive and negative shocks, respectively, for each day from January 2007 to October 2011. The financial crisis in the euro area seems to have unfolded in 
Structural model and test for contagion
Once dummy variables have been constructed for global shocks, regional shocks and countryspecific shocks, we include them in the structural model of interdependence. Testing for contagion simply amounts to testing whether a dummy variable picking up a shock specific to a country is also significant in the equation for another country.
The structural model is identified by restricting the lag structure. More specifically, for each country we include only its own dynamics and exclude lags of other countries. This assumption is supported by the estimation output of the reduced-form model. In the latter model, the sum of the two own lags is always close to but below unity, while the sum of the two lags of other countries always lays around zero. Thus, as emphasised by Dungey et al. Our estimation results also show that contagion has been widespread in the euro area during the crisis. Table 1 displays these results. Most of country-specific shocks are transmitted to at least one other country. Out of the thirty-eight country-specific shocks in our sample, twenty-five of these have been transmitted to at least another country. The bulk of non-contagious country-specific shocks can be found at the beginning of the sample period. Once the crisis has entered its intensification phase in the summer of 2011, all country-specific shocks are contagious.
Moreover, positive shocks, respectively negative shocks, do not necessarily induce positive, respectively negative shocks, in other countries. Some negative shocks in one country may have negative repercussions for some countries, yet positive effects for other countries. For example, the negative shock in Greece on 5 May 2010 led to negative repercussions on Ireland and Portugal (increased yields beyond the normal channels of interdependence) but a positive effect for the Netherlands (lower yield beyond the normal channel of interdependence). This opposite sign can be interpreted as flight to safety. As another example, the negative shock in Italy on 5 September 2011 led to higher yields in Spain, Greece and Portugal, but lower yields in the Netherlands and Germany. Again, this opposite sign provides evidence of flight to safety. In general, the presence of asymmetric contagious effects points to the need of identifying shocks carefully, and not simply to rely on sub-samples of data, thereby assuming that contagion will necessarily entail stronger interdependence.
Finally, global shocks affect many countries at the same time and in the same way. This finding is reassuring as it lends support to our identification strategy based on the historical record of news. Euro area shocks also affect several countries in most cases, but not always in the same way. For example, the announcement of several policy responses on 10 May 2010 led to substantial reduction in sovereign bond yields for Greece, Belgium, Ireland, Italy and Portugal, but higher yields for the Netherlands, Germany and France. This finding is not surprising as the bulk of the policy response rested on the abandonment of the no-bailout clause of the Maastricht Treaty. From that point onwards, the core European countries would agree to provide financial help to the periphery, such that fiscal developments in the latter would directly impede on the former.
Concluding remarks
To be written! 
